PRIOn Logo

CVE-2024-26629 Spoofing

Routine
Remediate Within 6 Months

CVE Information

Original CVE data

Published:
Updated:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix RELEASE_LOCKOWNER The test on so_count in nfsd4_release_lockowner() is nonsense and harmful. Revert to using check_for_locks(), changing that to not sleep. First: harmful. As is documented in the kdoc comment for nfsd4_release_lockowner(), the test on so_count can transiently return a false positive resulting in a return of NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD when in fact no locks are held. This is clearly a protocol violation and with the Linux NFS client it can cause incorrect behaviour. If RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is sent while some other thread is still processing a LOCK request which failed because, at the time that request was received, the given owner held a conflicting lock, then the nfsd thread processing that LOCK request can hold a reference (conflock) to the lock owner that causes nfsd4_release_lockowner() to return an incorrect error. The Linux NFS client ignores that NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD error because it never sends NFS4_RELEASE_LOCKOWNER without first releasing any locks, so it knows that the error is impossible. It assumes the lock owner was in fact released so it feels free to use the same lock owner identifier in some later locking request. When it does reuse a lock owner identifier for which a previous RELEASE failed, it will naturally use a lock_seqid of zero. However the server, which didn't release the lock owner, will expect a larger lock_seqid and so will respond with NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID. So clearly it is harmful to allow a false positive, which testing so_count allows. The test is nonsense because ... well... it doesn't mean anything. so_count is the sum of three different counts. 1/ the set of states listed on so_stateids 2/ the set of active vfs locks owned by any of those states 3/ various transient counts such as for conflicting locks. When it is tested against '2' it is clear that one of these is the transient reference obtained by find_lockowner_str_locked(). It is not clear what the other one is expected to be. In practice, the count is often 2 because there is precisely one state on so_stateids. If there were more, this would fail. In my testing I see two circumstances when RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is called. In one case, CLOSE is called before RELEASE_LOCKOWNER. That results in all the lock states being removed, and so the lockowner being discarded (it is removed when there are no more references which usually happens when the lock state is discarded). When nfsd4_release_lockowner() finds that the lock owner doesn't exist, it returns success. The other case shows an so_count of '2' and precisely one state listed in so_stateid. It appears that the Linux client uses a separate lock owner for each file resulting in one lock state per lock owner, so this test on '2' is safe. For another client it might not be safe. So this patch changes check_for_locks() to use the (newish) find_any_file_locked() so that it doesn't take a reference on the nfs4_file and so never calls nfsd_file_put(), and so never sleeps. With this check is it safe to restore the use of check_for_locks() rather than testing so_count against the mysterious '2'.

CWE:
CVSS v2-
CVSS v3-
References
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4cf8941664cae2f89f0189c29fe2ce8c6be0d03
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7d2eee1f53899b53f069bba3a59a419fc3d331b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f5b860de87039b007e84a28a5eefc888154e098
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edcf9725150e42beeca42d085149f4c88fa97afd
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6f8b3fcc62725e4129f2c0fd550d022d4a7685a
Affected Vendors

Basic Analysis

Common vulnerability metrics

Vulnerabilty type as detected by PRIOnengine

Spoofing

CVSS Scores as calculated by PRIOnengine
CVSS v22.1
AV:L/AC:L/AU:N/C:N/I:N/A:P
CVSS v35.9
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
MITRE CWE Top 25

-

Exploits

No exploit code is reported to exist.

Active Exploitation

Vulnerability is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. See the KEV Catalog

Social Network Activity

-

Threat Actor Activity

No sightings of the vulnerability within threat reports.

Cybersecurity Frameworks

How the vulnerability maps against various cybersecurity frameworks

-

Compliance Impact

How the submited vulnerability affects compliance

-

Web Application Security Frameworks

Applicable if the issue likely affects a web application

-